

NOTES TO LECTURE I

- {1} - Diversity will have to be respected, at least as a sign of something important, if not about any product of his labor, about his position.
- Inquiry into inquiry, the four Aristotle questions being applicable to philosophy itself. See {4-5} below.
 - The nature of logical argument may be a function of philosophy, and the same for scholarship, insofar as the former works out *all* that is being said (and not said), while the latter confronts the necessity of *saying* what has been said. The charge on philosophy requires it.
 - The possibility is that it does not have a subject matter and a way or mode in the sense that sciences have them.
 - It may be that inquiry into *itself* can only be done by *means* of inquiry into some kind of activity. Note that "activity" here implies one or more first principles at its base. We have this in the notion of definition and regulation, but that does not fully recognize the fact that all activity is communal in reference. That is, any inquiry will have a "practical" side—contributing a particular part in the life of the community. The philosopher stands between the activity and C (the community) while the member of a particular discipline will stand "between" the activity and the original standards or first principle.
 - Questions can be answered, in a way, of the following sort: How to get more out of the enterprise in terms of what is put into it? What sacrifices are made upon entering, what obligations picked up, what opportunities are provided? These would seem to be unanswerable to a non-participant.
 - "Reflection" is an anticipation of the "face" that is put on things as a result of an activity which puts a cover on things.
 - This (suspended reflection) implies taking the inquiry in hand in a particular state, holding it at a distance, and judging by some standard—an "original" standard—with the idea in mind of approaching the original even more. The idea would be to work *ahead* of the discipline at any point between the "given" state and the original state.
- {2} - We're going to claim that an S-member has the measure, and continually invokes it as a matter of belief, but that he cannot give an account of it (following Plato's *Theaetetus*). You cannot do both at the same time. So we take exception to Hans Reichenbach's recommendation.
- {3} - Particular modes do not necessarily increase well-being because or if they are luxury oriented. Universal modes will do so by "balanced" judgments.
- Distinguish division of labor *in re* objects, and division *in re* different approaches *to* the object (where the object may be the same).
 - It will be necessary to characterize a universal mode of inquiry as an activity in that it does not itself produce an object for use in the community—except through a particularization, as in engineering.
 - Distinguish law/cause *in re* "facts" in terms of suspension or displacement procedures, with *cause* taken in two ways—1) intention of the actor, and 2) intention of C. The idea is to *determine* the fact so that it fits into the "fabric" of C, both in terms of precedent and in terms of implications following upon the judgment.
 - "Exclusion" implies application of law itself in terms of *jurisdiction*.
 - A superior court is implied for handling jurisdictional matters, following the Aristotle charge.
 - We are denying a place for an S-member in C on the assumption that his work is "covering", which implies putting a "face" on things as a result. The Aristotle questions are asked again here in terms of "cover", using the tetrahedron as an example for "covering" a sphere, where the cube would be a "degenerate" form with two more "faces" than needed. This is another extension of the notion of complete circuits which hit all points (see notes—672ff).
 - The assumption here is that each mode is brought about under conditions of a particular deferment from PK obligation, so as to realize some other particular obligation in a way which is not reducible to direct carrying-out of the latter. This means that the results of modal inquiry are not directly or automatically beneficial to C, but require "tailoring" to "fit". These

- deferments would result in a “third” for the Aristotle pair— bogus/legitimate inquiry (the object in these cases being thought/action respectively).
- [3] - Behind this (notion of a comprehensive institutional theory) is the notion of theory (probably with Aristotle) that leads “out”, that is, that which is in mind such that it does not preclude the fullest range of choice of course of action in the community. Otherwise the “next”, forced “decision” is the only one to take. Remember that coercion is also universal and that it begins logically at the point of authority. A proper theory will be such that it stands as the ground for a decision based on what is *prior* for C in the decision instead of some inversion of priority.
- [9] - Two non-dynamic readings of scientific revolutions: 1) The “hard core” version, implying a hard “factual” crust—with adjustments made in between. 2) The “soft core” version, implying a “soft” factual crust—on the assumption that facts and basic logic are derivatives.
- [10] - A *measure* of progress is not progress itself. Yet only *with* a measure *is* progress possible. Only with a measure can a movement be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.
- Most particularly, the tendency of the philosopher to “hang back” from a dynamic theory of science will be seen, in its origins, to have considerable justification. The philosopher may very well have legitimate commitments—not having to do with science and other modes of inquiry, but which can only be met by a fully exhaustive critique of those modes. Above all others, he must be willing to do his *own* work in a way that preserves their autonomy. If he has made any assumptions about *himself* which are now part of the commitments of these modes, he must be willing to expunge them quite deliberately and decisively.
- [11] - Note that it is the *pair* (*change* of conditions/*change* of phenomenon) that we are interested in here, such that the real “change” is a difference in status of the S-member. He wants to be in position where he can say, “I made things happen myself.” This implies that there is *no change* of the conditions/result pair in itself.
- We are doing here what has been done later in other stuff—converting the language so as to keep the focus exclusively on the relation of the S-members *to* N (Nature) as well as each other.
 - So the positive import of the “above remarks” is based on this motivation, and must always be kept in mind when at work. The possibility of failure/success comes at this point and must itself be understood as a function of the claim—as evidenced in the *possessive* “myself”.
 - And, finally, it is *self*-possession which is at issue. So the question has to do with the chances of success or failure in *gaining* the self in such a situation. That makes the conversion complete.
 - Another way of putting the criterion of completeness for PK (see 223) is how *early* in the account the full conversion is accomplished. It must be there from the outset.
 - The above conversion then provides the base for “effectively disconfirmable”. Unpacking that phrase will put the statement in the “middle” of the above—the negative remarks and the self’s desires, as put together with the member on both sides, that is, personal desire/statement/event/self: “I want (by means of the statements I make) to make things happen myself”. This has the effect of “internalizing” certain events. This is the dynamic S-version of self-possession. It’s not a matter of “to” myself but “for” myself, and it’s the “making” that I want *for* myself.
 - It’s first a matter of undoing that which has been made firm. This will be the point of the judgment in II-C.
- [15] - Here is the argument for *avoiding* the usual temporal reading of the logic of state-dependence, where the conditions are assumed to be *temporally* prior:
- 1) Think of the dispositional term as the focus of the entire explanatory machinery. Take it as standing for all the conditions in terms of which that which it denotes (use “fuel” as dispositional) will *evidence* a *change* in state—

burning | not burning.

This is the so-called “event”, though so far it has neither beginning nor end, except at the line. Yet it is already complex.

- 2) Then think of those conditions as *alterable* such that burning is *prevented*. In that case

we again have an “event”, but one whose complex states are identical—

not burning | not burning (thanks to an alteration).

When a condition is thus altered there are two results. The “not burning” remains a significant state—it is a *different* event, because no change occurred.

However we must now represent that significant change of conditions. That change would have to be said to have occurred “on the line”. Otherwise, if temporally prior, burning would still be possible if there were to be *another* change cancelling the first. That other change would, again, have to be said to “take place” on the line.

- 3) If we have it in mind to *stop* the burning, those same conditions would have to be changed again (to stop the burning, then, comes out the “same” as to stop the fuel *from* burning), and the argument in 2) holds again—that is, the change must occur on the line—

not burning | not burning | not burning.

Thus the *conditions-for-burning and burning* occur *between* the lines, and all-*other-conditions and not-burning* occur between the other lines. The conditions for an event to occur must then occur *during* the event, and *no* event of temporally prior sort could be taken as a *condition* for some other event. In other words, only *states* can be cited as conditions for an event, and only *states of that event* as it occurs. These states may then be distinguished one from the other according to practical purposes in the given situation.

From this point as a *starting point*, all the business of quality and quantity of burning can be developed in terms of the relations between states. This business would include the *length* of the event and its terminal points.

- 4) Without the usual bias, as evidenced above, it must also be insisted that a so-called “change of conditions” takes place “on the line” to “start” the not-burning or to “stop” it. It then turns out that the import of 1), 2), and 3) above is the *rejection of prior events* as a condition for occurrence of an event, except for the case of “not-burning” as an event prior to *all* significant cases of “burning” (because conditions somehow controlled by change).

All conditions, then, are states which are not merely contemporaneous *with* the event, but a combination *with* that event in a complex atemporal state—which state may be said to be conserved (maintained over time) whenever we have “control of changes”. This means closer and closer identification *with* the act.

- 5) Note that the “control” of “changes” must involve the ability to “change things”. Then there is the question as to whether this means changing changes in our environment, or that it means that control of changes is different from gaining control of a change (*assuming* that *gaining* control is a change itself— see 8 below).

Perhaps control of changes will involve the opposite—*working* to avoid changing things. But that itself might be illusory— as if it were still possible but could be counteracted. That would be a double-level illusion. Instead, how about *never talking* as if we have changed anything—and acting accordingly? This would involve denial that we control things in *any way*, that what we are aiming for are controls on ourselves *when* we say and do things with each other. In that case, *gaining* control would not change anything—neither “things” nor “people”.

- 6) It is the case, however, that things are changed due to our explanatory efforts, and reliably so—very much under control. But those changes are always of *things-as-they-are-to-us* (thus the Kantian angle) to *things-as-they-are-otherwise-to-us*. The only alternative to the passive aspect of the Kantian line is one involving *gain* of more, if “seen” (by judgment of perception). But this gain is not necessarily of more simple ability to change things, and, even if so, that might be merely a derivative result. *Conatus* will be further satisfied. See 5) above, where preservation (conservation) is seen as the foundation of control. The ideal is to bring conditions to bear in such a way that they are more and more produced continuously in the process itself, while not losing the ability to change conditions to alter or stop it. The next problem is alterability “in the light of new events”. Presumably a new event in this case would be either burning *beyond* the *purpose*, or not not-burning *before* the *purpose* is

accomplished. Thus the purpose ideally will be met, *whatever it is*, when itself contemporaneous with the event.

- 7) So the change will be of conditions for an occurrence, to get everything *there is* out of a situation *for* our purposes. Inevitably what this means is not only a willingness but an insistence that we “gain” *less* than there is in the situation, but *reliably* so. Control would then involve, as its chief characteristic, the ability to *take* less. The most successful operation would then involve taking or gaining *nothing* essentially. (This is a version of particularization as found in S. Here also is the context for D’Abro’s argument about the manifold and differentiation of it—without the Kantian limitation it seems to imply.) *Every step* in this direction would require a *word* (a contract is what will finally result—and full “explanation”) to “make up the difference”. It would be this *counterbalance* of what is “left out”, *eliminated*, which would stand as the base *meaning* of any “concept” for which the word *stands*. Only on the basis of words made in this way and *then* taken (used) *as if* standing *for* a “particular object” will control be gained in the inquiry. (Note also that so far we are still restricted to the *business* of S—*manufacture* as well as *use*.)
- 8) This assumption (see 5 above) may be erroneous. It may be that the one thing we want to *avoid* in gaining control of a change effected by someone (control being essentially contractual) is a *kind* of control which *itself* would be in any way a change. It should also be noted that this recognition of a prior act is a recognition of being *at work* with Nature, and that any subsequent inter-personal contract includes respect for Nature and the terms set by it.
- 9) As with Spinoza, whatever “business” there is at work between agent and Nature they are *at One* in that act.
- The matching involves:

Abstract statement of “states”.

Instantial statement of an *event*.

- Thus, a manipulation of the various *packages* of states comprising various *kinds* of events. Thus an event is a *complex*. Kinds/types is a *result* of this packaging.
- The distinction between boundary/initial conditions opens up the original distinction—spells it out. *All three* will lead to “optimal conditions”.
 - The adjudication of the nature of the act and its match with the law—which comes *last*:

General law

contract

not burning | not burning | not burning.

habeas corpus (implies an act).

Think of the use of evidence in this context as determining the nature of the act—but by judgment, not automatically. It is weighed.

- 10) We’ll have to work down below this surface. All “changes of condition”, if controlled, must be effected within a contractual setup. The base “words” of the contract, when defined as discussed earlier (see 7 above), must be put to use *as if* standing *for* things—which things will then be said to occur in a certain way. However, the statement of initial conditions (as developed in 2 above) will be essentially the positing of an act. The act, in turn, thanks to a coordinating definition, will be associated with the changed conditions for the occurrence of those things posited by the contract.
- Sufficient/necessary conditions “for another event to occur: for the same event either to occur or to continue to occur, or to recur. Substitute *state* of *states* for necessary/sufficient conditions.
- It all really comes to the combination of atemporal states—including the “event” to be produced. To think otherwise would be illusory.
- The distinction then really reflects delimitation, differentiation, specification of the atemporal complex of states. (All of this leads to change/control as a matter of control/change of

statements.) In gaining control, we add/subtract, stop/start, with some equality always involved. The same holds in trying to specify—to reduce different “causes” to the same.

- In practice, the distinction reflects work to *eliminate* the *illusion* that something is *needed*, *not needed*, or that *what* is needed is a matter of choice. This takes us effectively to the position that what is *wanted* is the only legitimate matter of concern, to avoid the illusion that *we* start or stop, add or subtract, what is needed—specifically.
- All of this reflects the logical irreducibility of an act (light the match, say) to what *we* say we have done. What we say will always be, as noted earlier, a *contractual derivative* of that act. (That’s the one “thing” that “happens” on that line between not burning | burning.) What we say will always, then, refer to *control* of ourselves *if* such acts are recurrent.
- Distinguish actual conditions from ideal conditions. This implies two sets of variations on a single set of *ideal* conditions plus a variability condition, in order to claim that the same event was occurring in the several cases.
- Emphasize the *resultant* inter-changeability of parts by several persons.
- Note: The original typed text included the following paragraph and footnotes.

Finally, the relativity of usage of the terms “condition” and “event” is seen in the fact that there is apparently no impropriety among logicians of science in referring to resultant events as “conditions”, and to non-temporal conditional states as “occurrences”¹. No hard distinction need be made between the two notions as long as the actual terms used in the scientific statement of conditions are dispositional².

¹ [Hempel and Oppenheim, *op.cit.*, p.338, where the former locution appears in a formal definition of explanation; and Sheffler, Israel, in *Anatomy of Inquiry*, where, in discussing a related issue, he refers to the presence of chlorophyll both as a “necessary condition” (p.50) and as an “occurrence” which “takes place” (p.52).]

² [This first conclusion—that the condition/event distinction is merely relative—might seem trivial. There is nothing in the current literature to indicate otherwise. Later on, however, there will be occasion to consider special cases where the distinction is absolute. Before that occasion it may very well be that all three conclusions in this chapter will seem fairly commonplace.]

- This stuff (footnotes) involves an imprecise usage—a tendency to obscure the distinction entirely because of the underlying identity that keeps popping up. Significant events *do* occur under control in terms of control/change of conditions. The distinction, then, is not viable unless it is tri-partite, with “states” as the fulcrum—*states of events*, *statements of conditions*. It is not that someone has merely brought some state into being, but that he is contracting—being held responsible for an act as specified.
 - What has been said about temporally prior events will also have to be said about temporally posterior events, tempting Hempel to obscure the *difference* in terms of *effects* (results) and Sheffler to do the same in terms of *causes*.
 - This is the crucial case, and again *directly* reflects the relativity of usage—which is *really* not relative *ever*, since conditions are states and a “state of events” is not itself an event. Connect a “state” of events with a “statement” (“mention”—posit?) of conditions for the occurrence of an event. Anyway, in the present case we are looking for greater precision in *packaging* states in the *given* event to find the matching general complex.
- [16] - 11) In **I-B** we look at the same situation from another angle. Logically we slice the apple differently.
- The distinction between descriptive/prescriptive statements itself involves a “third” element, such that prescription is distinguishable from prediction (having *said* “before” as distinct from having written down or ruled “before”)—not merely that someone happens to have said before he happens to see something and reported it.
 - A similar way of looking at “ideal” conditions: Think of each law as inevitably diminishing an act (which will be relational thanks to contractual control of individuals) from the original. The idea is to *aim for* laws which do so in a *balanced* way —to come *to terms* with a situation on *equal* terms. Thus only will a maximum, *joint* benefit be gained in the way of control. Yet any *given* particular experimental law will constitute some deviation from such

a balance. Thus there must also be some law which will effect the balancing—that's the basis of a theoretical law in this context.

- A distinction seems necessary, then, such that optimal conditions are distinguished from "actual" conditions on the basis of the *former's* neutrality. You do not want to hold two different investigators to the same "actual" conditions, because *they* will never be the same. In **I-B** we are concentrating on the opposite perspective from **I-A**. In **I-B** it's a matter of at least *two acts*, which cannot be denied in their uniqueness. (We worked on this qualitatively way back in the Jordan/Croce business.) For any plurality of situations where condition **I-A** is set up, a different result would occur.
- In **I-A** we aimed for closer and closer identification with the act (set up and produce condition/event). In **I-B** we now start to aim at identification of purpose in the case of disparate acts. So we're preparing for **II** in that rules/procedures must be codified to *accomplish* these *two kinds* of identification.
- N.B. It now appears that the two acts we refer to are unique only because one of them is an *act based on the other*. Two acts with the *same* conditions is the problem dealt with in **I-A**, where differences are accommodated by identification with a *single* original *act*—accomplished by joint identification of *states*.
- Adjudication in **I-B**, then, is *another* problem (the problem discussed in **I-C** is another), where there will inevitably be disagreement about the nature of several acts, *all* based on the original act. What is behind this is the fact that the statement of conditions (once accomplished as in **I-A**) *means* nothing until and unless *acted upon*—which automatically generates the new problem in **I-B**, where the emphasis is clearly on *acts*, for the first time in this exposition. We tended to confuse the two.
- Also, the whole idea of **I-B** is to open up the situation *to* purposes, once the ground has been established in **I-A**. All significant acts are purposive, and our example in **II-B** is a simple instance.
- Read "ideal" in the "must be", "communal", like it or not, sense of *Republic*, in reference to the *necessity* of *meeting* the prescribed conditions (to *hold* someone to the conditions). Emphasize the *resultant* inter-changeability of parts by several persons.
- We *hold* someone to the conditions in this case by holding him to the operations set up according to the coordinating definition. But don't go too far in this, to the point of confusing **I-B** with **I-C** again.
- The idea in **I-A**, then, is to match the statement to an event complex—to complete it in a "balanced" way. *Leave out a condition*, add an *extra one*, and an imbalance will occur. The *balance* in **I-A** is *eventual*—in **I-B** *purposive*—in terms of an *act*.
- 12) Note that the atemporality developed earlier is *entirely* a function of the necessity to "state" rules. This cleans up the "empirical look" of *legalité*. The matter becomes clearer in the context of **II-A**, where we move on to discussion of *agreement to state* a rule.
- Restriction of applicability will always be the case, and any single law thus taken is not yet subject to control for the purpose of balancing it with other versions of the law based on variable conditions. It's not merely a matter of *approximation* in an ideal standard at this point, but of *adjudicating* claims and counterclaims. A theoretical law then constitutes primarily a *judgment*.
- You can't take back a purposive act, no matter how it is judged.
- So a theoretical law, though it appears to overcome restriction, does so only relatively in the sense that it coordinates acts which could have been even more delimited if in conflict with each other, thanks to the agents.
- On the other hand, though we aim for wider ranges of applicability, we do not gain it except by *conversion* of adjudicating law to experimental law status. This is Poincaré's point. See **II-A**{31}. This conversion accounts for the fact that the nature of the optimal conditions of a fundamental law is open for decision until **II-C**, where the identity is finally invoked, and the discipline fully based.
- See 11) above for more on this. What we are trying to balance here in **I-B** is the act of change, an act based on the eventual balance achieved in **I-A**, where we are trying to *balance agents* when they perform that act (did he heat it properly or not?). The *different* balancing problem in **I-B** is such that the notion of manipulable conditions is raised properly here. This

allows us to “unplug” the meaning of the coordinating definition, which is still fairly blank in **II-B**.

- {20} - Presumably the term in such cases (energy, momentum, etc.—no longer restricted to fixed inertial mass) is not just open-ended, and would never be defined explicitly.
- {21} - *accommodate*—fr. *com* + *modus*, measure, proportion. To make fit, help. See 852. This must go to the mutual dependence (and thus “covered”), united front (“faced”), and autonomy of the modes taken together.
 - The question is dual here (nothing without devices): Internal—acting/thinking real, not suffering from illusion. External—speaking well or ill, no better than its devices. Otherwise still hostages to fully adaptable devices—can’t get around them.
 - “Life” questions about a law—the “lives” involved of those committed to such statements.
 - Re-raising Aristotle on the good—state/individual—*and* on the “sciences”, separate and together.
 - Preliminary: Universal adaptation *to* events—whatever they are. Necessary adaptation *to* purposes—whatever they are.