Common Science

A Philosophical Investigation

by John R. Bosworth

Preface

This investigation was written back and forth, to myself, over a number of years while I was teaching Philosophy and Humanities at Oklahoma State University. The manuscript can be seen as a kind of "laboratory record" of thought. It includes all working notes, cross references, indexes, and work-sheets. Its conversion to print has been kept to a minimum of editing, save for dividing up much of the writing into paragraphs. In addition there are two introductory classroom Lectures, and two appendices. The first appendix is a writing on the thought of the historian of science Emile Meyerson, which was planned to follow the lectures as a "third chapter". The second is a last writing on Johannes Kepler.

Common Science is dedicated to the memory of Max Fisch.

The expert typesetting and layout work of Advanced Data Solutions' Wilmer Paine, scholar and friend, made the printing of this work possible.

- John R. Bosworth, 1999, Stillwater, Oklahoma

Lecture I

SECTION ONE

Philosophical inquiry is traditionally diverse' in character, especially when it is directed upon itself. Aside from a long-standing association with the discipline of logical argument, and a tradition of scholarship, its conduct often appears to be little disciplined as to its own proper subject matter and method of inquiry. But when philosophical inquiry is itse lf concentrated on a particular kind of human activity, such as scientific inquiry, the prime concern is with the instituted discipline which clearly defines and regulates that activity. In studying scientific inquiry, the philosopher will feel able to put aside a concern for controlled inquiry in his own right, especially when he sees that scientists themselves appear to suspend their own discipline, for a time, in order to consider so-called "philosophical" questions. The work of the mathematical physicist Albert Einstein is often taken as a good example of such suspension. The use of the word "philosophical" in this context is neither obscure nor trivial once it is recognized that such questions are essentially critical. They are instances of the continued reflection on a disciplined activity which is necessary in keeping it viable - reflection which cannot be accomplished while working within it.

The fact that each distinct human activity is self-critical of its discipline, however, apparently leaves the professional philosopher in the position of a permanent amateur - interested in a range of activities, but directly involved in none of them. Few cases can be found, since his profession became full-time and separate, where he can be credited with a major advance in the conduct of any of the "positive" disciplines. He has been faced, lately, with the hard choice either of abandoning his study of the nature and significance of human activity in a comprehensive way or of developing a new discipline of his own which would not be merely a modest ancillary of one of those other disciplines. More often than not, he will put off such a choice. The possible results of delay will be discussed in a few moments.

If it is the case, following a traditional philosophical argument, that disciplined human activities do differ in kind, to the point that such basic ones as science and religion can be distinguished, there is at least the slim chance that philosophical inquiry need not be diffuse and in disarray. Although each activity is ideally self-critical in the person of a professional with sufficient first-hand experience of it, this same professional is not thereby equipped to compare and contrast his discipline with others. His criticism is directed only upon his own activity, and never involves a recommended shift to a different kind. The "philosophical" suspension of discipline, is, then, not complete for him, but only somehow loosened for the sake of carrying out that same kind of activity in a better way. In this sense he cannot see himself at work even when he is being critical.

Perhaps the philosopher, on the other hand, could develop reliable criteria for just such an explicit differentiation of kinds. He might have the advantage because none of the particular disciplines is so ingrained that he would be misled by familiarity, as is so often the case with the professional scientist and religionist. The latter have been known to characterize their work in the most diverse ways, often picking up their views quite casually.

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Lecture I

Lecture II

Chapter 1
INVESTMENT

Chapter 2
RETURN

Chapter 3
MODEL

Chapter 4
TEAM

Chapter 5
COMPETITION

Chapter 6
JUDGMENT (Mediation/Advocacy)

Chapter 7
RETAIL / WHOLESALE

Chapter 8
MANIPULATION

Chapter 9
INTRUSION